Maio 2021 vol. 8 num. 2 - V Encontro Nacional de Economia Industrial e Inovação

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Innovation competition in horizontal mergers: choosing the framework for Competition Policy assessment

Innovation competition in horizontal mergers: choosing the framework for Competition Policy assessment

Lyra, Marcos Puccioni de Oliveira ; Pires-Alves, Camila Cabral ;

Artigo completo:

Este artigo discute a avaliação de fusões horizontais e dano à inovação quando há concorrência em inovação. O objetivo é construir um esquema para a escolha adequada do framework de análise, apresentando, para cada situação: mecanismos para identificar concorrência em inovação, para definir mercado relevante e avaliação da competitividade das firmas, identificação das teorias de dano adequadas e evidências. Revisamos a literatura sobre Política de Defesa da Concorrência e Economia da Inovação e utilizamos exemplos da jurisprudência dos EUA e da Europa. Discutimos também brevemente a literatura de gestão estratégica para fornecer insights para a avaliação. Considerando as reduções pós-fusão nos incentivos a inovar como dano à inovação, encontramos diferenças quanto à adequação do passo-a-passo tradicional e desafios para construir evidências considerando três faces da concorrência por inovação, incluindo possíveis combinações destas faces em um mesmo caso de fusão: (i) esforços de inovação incremental no mercado de produto, (ii) esforços em andamento para desenvolver novos produtos e (iii) esforços de inovação futuros. Quando o passo-a-passo tradicional é inadequado, argumentamos em favor do uso de uma avaliação baseada nas capacidades, alterando o passo-a-passo de análise.

Artigo completo:

This article discusses the assessment of horizontal mergers and harm to innovation when there is innovation competition. The goal is to build a scheme for the proper choice of the framework of analysis, presenting, for each situation: mechanisms to identify innovation competition, to undertake market definition, to assess the competitive significance of firms, identification of the appropriate theories of harm and evidence. We review the literature on Competition Policy and on Economics of Innovation and take examples from the US and European case law. We also briefly discuss the strategic management literature to provide insights for the assessment. Considering post-merger reductions on innovation incentives as harm to innovation, we find differences of traditional merger procedure adequacy and challenges to build evidence, considering three faces of innovation, including possible combinations of these faces within a same merger case: (i) incremental innovation efforts in the product market, (ii) ongoing efforts for developing new products and (iii) future innovation efforts. When the traditional merger procedure is inadequate, we argue in favor of using a capabilities-based assessment, changing the step-by-step procedure.

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Palavras-chave: Defesa da Concorrência, Fusões, Inovação, Capacidades,

Palavras-chave: Competition Policy, Mergers, Innovation, Capabilities,

DOI: 10.5151/v-enei-780

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Como citar:

Lyra, Marcos Puccioni de Oliveira; Pires-Alves, Camila Cabral; "Innovation competition in horizontal mergers: choosing the framework for Competition Policy assessment", p. 2234-2257 . In: Anais do V Encontro Nacional de Economia Industrial e Inovação (ENEI): “Inovação, Sustentabilidade e Pandemia”. São Paulo: Blucher, 2021.
ISSN 2357-7592, DOI 10.5151/v-enei-780

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